Growth to improve amid gradual disinflation
In light of the fact that the anticipated disinflationary process is set to gain momentum in 2025, the Turkish economy is poised for an enhanced growth trajectory and a more balanced macroeconomic outlook. The contribution of domestic demand (approximately 60% of GDP) to growth will inch up as the Central Bank's policy rate, which increased by 4,150 basis points to 50% between June 2023 and March 2024, is expected to be cut as low as the 25-30% range, in line with disinflation. However, the negative impact of the durably elevated inflation rate will continue to weigh on the purchasing power of middle and lower incomes. Accordingly, the higher contribution of private demand to growth will be led mostly by the upper income group. Conversely, the tighter fiscal policy and spending cuts (excluding reconstruction in the wake of the two earthquakes in 2023) will reduce the public-sector contribution (approximately 12% of GDP) to growth. Following a period of weakness due to elevated financing costs in 2024, private investments (approximately 10% of GDP) are expected to show gradual improvement from 2025 onwards. Net exports will continue to drag on growth albeit to a lesser extent thanks to the anticipated recovery in European demand, lower global energy prices, the restriction on gold imports, and higher tourism revenues (USD 56 billion, up 6% from 2024).
The Turkish lira will continue to appreciate in real terms in 2025, which is expected to provide support to the disinflation process. Annual inflation is projected to decline close to 30% by year-2025, although it will remain significantly above the Central Bank's forecast of 14%. Barring an unexpected exchange rate shock, this should drive disinflation by slowing the rise in imported basic goods prices. However, it will not be easy to break the price inertia in the services group given the impact of seasonality, the deterioration in income distribution and the difficulties in anchoring inflation expectations.
Narrowing external deficit, with fiscal consolidation to continue
Despite the gap in the income balance, the surplus in the services balance and the narrowing of the foreign trade deficit will again reduce the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP in 2025. Tourism and transportation revenues are expected to be among the most important contributors to the services surplus. While the narrowing of the trade deficit was mainly due to a decline in imports in 2024, the deficit should be more related to an increase in exports in 2025. On that score, the improvement in demand conditions will lead to an increase in imports of intermediate goods, which account for about 70% of total imports. In addition, the recovery of growth in Europe, in line with looser monetary policy, will have a positive impact on the Turkish exports. The main risk factor to this scenario is the impact on commodity prices of developments in the Middle East. If the war leads to the closure of important transit routes for global oil (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz) or disrupts oil production, the rise in energy prices could widen the current account deficit. In 2024, the moderation in demand caused by the official monthly cap on credit growth (2%) has helped narrow the current account deficit and improved the central bank's international reserves. At October 2024, the central bank’s gross international reserves had risen to USD 157.4 billion (around 86% of short-term external debt stock) from USD 98.5 billion in May 2023. The growth in reserves has resulted in a decrease in the risk premium – the 5-year USD CDS fell to 275 points in October 2024 vs. 888 points in July 2022. This has increased the country's ability to attract foreign capital inflows. Conversely, the reliance on short-term inflows to support the increase in reserves (portfolio inflows reached USD 15 billion in the first eight months of 2024 vs. USD 930 million during the same period of 2023) presents a challenge for the central bank to maintain Turkish lira stability in the face of potential external pressures.
The anticipated fiscal consolidation will be driven by increased revenues in line with higher economic growth and reduced expenditure. The legislation introduced in July 2024, which set a minimum tax rate of 15% for multinational firms and 10% for domestic firms, was a clear indication from the government of its intention to tighten fiscal policy. The current transfers, representing approximately 35% of total expenditures, are projected to increase by around 35% in 2025. This follows an 80% rise in 2024, largely attributable to earthquake-related costs in 2023. The slowdown in inflation will facilitate a deceleration in the growth of personnel expenditures, which constitute 30% of the total. Additionally, capital expenditures are expected to inch up only by around 1% in 2025, a decrease in real terms, compared with 2024 while capital transfers would fall by around 50%.
Regional geopolitical tensions will be a marker in foreign policy
Türkiye is governed by a presidential system which was adopted by referendum in 2017 and has been in effect since mid-2018. Under this system, executive powers and duties are exercised and fulfilled by the President according to the Constitution and the law. Following the 2023 presidential and 2024 local elections, the domestic political scene which is mostly dominated by President Recep Tayyip Erdo?an and his Justice and Development Party (AK Parti) is expected to be relatively more stable. While Türkiye’s foreign policy has been primarily driven by economic considerations in recent years, geopolitical tensions, particularly in the Middle East, are expected to become a more significant factor from 2025 onwards. The country is expected to proceed with caution to avoid being drawn into the conflicts.
Second, Türkiye will continue to serve as a pivotal global diplomatic mediator, particularly in the ongoing discussions between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as in the negotiations between Ukraine and Russia. Türkiye has expanded its presence in Africa, investing in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications. It has established robust economic ties with African nations, positioning itself as a crucial partner (trade between Africa and Türkiye rose to USD 37 billion in 2023 from USD 5 billion in 2003). The ties with Russia, ranging from energy to the grain corridor, are expected to continue, including cooperation over regional conflicts such as in Libya, Syria, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Last, China could become interested in investing in the country to move closer to Western markets. After the second Karabakh War in 2020, an agreement was reached to remove economic and transportation impediments in the region. In this context, the Zangezur Corridor via Armenia, which connects Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and Türkiye, became a priority. Opening the corridor would create a direct land route with Azerbaijan, one of Türkiye's primary economic partners, while also enabling Türkiye's trade with Central Asia. Armenia and Iran are against the project.
Despite the current challenges in their relationship, Türkiye, the US and the European Union remain committed to maintaining their diplomatic engagements. The Turkish Foreign Minister's attendance at an informal EU Foreign Ministers’ meeting in August 2024 after a five-year absence indicated the potential for renewed momentum in EU-Türkiye relations. In terms of US foreign policy, post-election practices will be pivotal in shaping relations with Türkiye. Despite the parties' differing stances on foreign policy, including their respective positions on issues such as Ukraine-Russia and the war in Israel, there are certain stabilising factors such as the NATO alliance and Türkiye's status as a regional power that can contribute to a more stable relationship. Türkiye's application for BRICS membership in September 2024 was likely to have been driven by the country's pursuit of an alternative to its stalled EU membership, in line with its foreign policy of maintaining balance.